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'BEYOND THE CAPACITY OF A SMALL ISLAND':1 A REVIEW OF 
UNPUBLISHED RESEARCH BY WA GRIFFITH ON MALTESE 
DOCKYARDS* 
Simon Mercieca 
Abstract 
The paper is concerned with a piece of 
unpublished research on the history of 
Maltese dockyards by WA Griffith, 
completed in 1917, It is in three parts, 
Firstly, the background to the commissioning 
of the work by the Senior Naval Officer in 
Malta between 1916 and 1919 is described, 
The problems facing the ultimately abortive 
project are then examined, and finally a 
critical review of the research is offered, 
Background to the Commissioning of 
the Research 
However much writers may hope their 
endeavours will find a publisher, usually for 
financial or academic reasons not all their 
outpourings appear in print. This paper 
concerns research by W A Griffith entitled A 
Brief Outline of the Foundation and Detachments 
of HM Establishments at Malta, which was 
never published, but a copy of which is held 
by the National Library at Valletta, dated 
1917, It is clear that Griffith did not write his 
history about the Maltese dockyards for 
academic reasons, but was commissioned by 
Admiral Ballard, the Senior Naval Officer 
(SNO) in Malta between 1916 and 1919, with 
the intention that the work would be used as 
a sort of propaganda by the British at a time 
when the morale at the dockyards was low. 
The choice of Griffith was not arbitrary, he 
simply appeared to be the best person capable 
of undertaking this type of study. He was well 
versed in the humanities, indeed, in one of 
the confidential typed papers sent to the 
Admiralty in London, he was described as 
'Officier d'Academie Franfaise'.2 
Not much biographical information is 
available about Griffith3 in Malta. His name 
does not figure in the local Maltese 
biographies, He worked for a number of years 
with the Admiralty and while in Malta 
showed interest in Maltese archaeological 
studies. In fact, he published a paper on the 
subject at a time when he worked as Assistant 
Cashier of the Admiralty dockyards.4 More 
plentiful is information on Rear Admiral 
George Alexander Ballard, From the cradle, 
he was destined for the navy. His life has been 
the subject of a number of studies and articles, 
some of which can also be downloaded from 
the internet.s 
What is of particular relevance is the fact 
that Griffith's commission came at a time of 
real significance in the history of the Malta 
dockyards. During Ballard's tenure of office 
at the dockyard, unprecedented events 
happened which had the effect of 
undermining his reputation with the 
Admiralty Office. His war and torpedo 
strategy against the German submarines 
during the early days of hostilities failed to 
have the desired effect and seems to have been 
behind his premature removal from office and 
promotion to head of the Malta dockyards. 
Then, when hewas SNO, the first major strike 
erupted in 1917 and another occurred after 
the end ofthewarin 1919. This was followed 
a few days later by riots and disturbances in 
Valletta which resulted in the death of six 
people. There appear to have been a number 
of different reasons which encouraged 
Ballard to commission the study. 
Firstly, the available information suggests 
that it was merely a propaganda exercise. As 
SNO, Ballard wanted to use, the work as 
positive propaganda in favour of the British.6 
According to Ballard, the reason for the 
current antagonism against the British in 
Malta, in particular at the docks, was due to 
the illiteracy of the masses. At the time, there 
was an extensive debate in Malta about the 
need to educate the working classes and how 
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. they could be better instructed. One particular 
person who held this staunch idea and who 
was very infl uen tial in govern men t and 
Imperial circles, was the Crown Advocate Dr. 
Mikielang Refalo.7 The succeeding Crown 
Advocate Arturo Mercieca continued to 
develop this idea and supported the need for 
the Imperial Government to have a permanent 
system to combat negative criticism by giving 
information to the people.8 
Th us, pushing forward the idea of 
education and using the research as a form of 
educational material to shQw to the general 
Maltese public the importance of the 
dockyards to Malta, was in line with what the 
Crown Advocate was proposing. One needs 
to remember that the British Colonial 
Administration based its rule on the advice 
of the Crown Advocate. He was the linchpin 
between the Governor and the Maltese elite, 
being the legal representative of the elected 
Maltese me'mbers to the Council of 
Government. 
At the time, the dockyard au thori ties 
lacked historical knowledge about 
shipbuilding and repairing in Malta. Despite 
the fact that the British had been in Malta 
over 117 years by 1917, the Admiralty had 
scarcely any information about the history of 
its new arsenal. Furthermore, the information 
. about the arsenals of the Knights was 
predominantly in Italian, a language which 
was foreign to many British administrative 
officers. Most probably if such information 
existed, or if in the case of the Knights' period, 
it was available in books written in English, 
the Rear Admiral would not have felt the need 
to ask Griffith for a brief outline about the 
history of Malta's arsenals and dry docks. 
This issue emerges very clearly from the 
correspondence that passed between Ballard 
and the Admiralty in London. 
A second reason for the commissioning of 
the work was Ballard's own particular interest 
in naval history; indeed after his retirement 
he wrote a number of articles and books on 
maritime topics and political-military 
strategy.9 This is not explicit in the 
correspondence with the Admiralty, but can 
be read between the lines. Ballard had written 
a short history of the Admiralty Dockyards. 
There is no doubt that Ballard based his 
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writing on Griffith's work. Now he wanted to 
do a favour to Griffith and the best way to 
publish it was to seek the help of the 
Admiralty. In fact, Griffi th does not only ask 
for the Admiralty to sponsor his publication, 
but also to pay him a form of honorarium for 
it. It was only after Griffith had completed 
his research that he entered into both informal 
and formal conversation with Ballard 
regarding its publication, and it was at this 
point that Ballard began to toy with the idea 
of having it published at the expense of the 
British tax payer. 
There seems to have been another covert 
reason for the publication of the study. 
Ballard seems to have used the occasion of 
the correspondence with the Admiralty to 
further his claim for promotion to become 
Malta's next Governor after Governor 
Methuen. Further remarks on this score 
appear below. 
Problems Facing Publication 
The British establishment in Malta 
attributed the unrest manifested in the 
dockyard workers' strikes to what they called 
mischievous propaganda put forward by the 
pro-Italian faction. Furthermore,there were 
a number of parties at the time agitating the 
people for self-determination or Maltese 
home rule. The British were afraid that owing 
to this negative propaganda, the general 
public was likely 'to forget what benefits they 
have already derived, and are likely to derive 
in future, from British rule'.10 
In 1919, the political faction that was 
considered'as the biggest threat to British rule 
was that which expressed pro-Italian 
sentiments. The British authorities began 
more and more to sense a sort of mischievous 
Italian propaganda against them in Italy and 
that this propaganda was gaining ground in 
Malta. The trouble in the dockyards was 
attributed in part to the support that these 
Italian politicians and local Italian trained 
lawyers were ga,ining amongst the dock 
workers. Many of the workers were judged 
illiterate and therefore susceptible to swallow 
any anti-British propaganda as Bible truth. 
The risk was even higher, as almost all these 
illiterate workers were very reli'gious and prone 
to bel-ieye all that the priests told them. The 
oJ 
majority ofthe latter were behind this Italian 
faction or any party which supported the 
Italian cause and the clerical interest. In 
Malta, despite the fact that unified Italy was 
Liberal and anti-clerical, the Italian language 
continued to be associated by the c1ergywith 
the Catholic faith. Its substitution for English 
was seen as the language of a heathen religion 
and its diffusion increased the risk of 
proselytisa tion and conversion to the 
Anglican faith. 
In confidential letters exchanged with the 
Admiralty in London, beginning on 27 May 
1919, Ballard advanced the idea that the latter 
should sponsor both the publication of his 
public lecture and Griffith's work. For some 
time, the Ballard's interlocutor in London 
was Brigadier Simple. According to him, the 
British had to react in Malta by showing all 
the people, 'the advantages they would lose 
by getting rid of British rule and some pro-
British propaganda for this purpose seems 
necessary'. II Griffith's work was therefore 
deemed by Brigadier Simple as useful whilst 
the costs involved were classified as 'low' and 
'very desirable'. After the break up ofthe June 
1919 riots, the idea of creating some sort of 
positive media reaction gained ground; the 
publication of any sort of book which could 
boast about the British presence in Malta was 
likely to be welcomed by the authorities in 
London. 
Brigadier Simple considered public 
conferences as being more effective 
propaganda. In this regard, Ballard gave a 
public lecture at the old University on the 
importance of the dOCkYard. This lecture was 
held at the University in Valletta, and perhaps 
for the first time in Malta, the audience was 
entertained by the projection of a slide show 
using what were described as lantern slides 
to illustrate his talk. It was suggested that 
these lantern slides with a slight adjustment 
should be loaned and used to give lectures in 
schools, whilst a copy of the talk was given to 
Greenwich Maritime Museum.12 
Despite the Brigadier's view, the 
publication of books was seen as a far more 
effective method of public relations. This 
conclusion was arrived at by experience. 
Ballard's talk was published in the form of a 
pamphlet and was sold at the price of one 
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shilling per copy. The cost was considered too 
high with the result that sales were small, only 
80 copies being sold, with the result that 
according to the British, 'only a small section 
of the Maltese public was influenced'.13 
Simple tried to help Ballard in the 
distribution of this book by suggesting it 'to 
be placed on the market at a lower price or 
else combined with Mr. Griffith's history and 
the two together sold for Id or 2d provided 
that the Admiralty will advance the necessary 
expenses' .14 
Griffith did much of the groundwork for 
the publication of his work. He approached 
the proprietor of a local printing press owned 
by Augustus Bartolo for a quotation. Bartolo 
was also the owner of the pro-British 
newspaper, The Malta Chronicle. The 
quotation for both the printing and the 
distribution of the book was considered much 
cheaper than if it had been printed in 
England. In a letter to the Senior Naval Officer 
in Malta, Griffith advanced the idea of getting 
paid for his labour and clearly informed him 
that the requested sum 'does not include the 
cost of my private time spent in studying and 
compiling this Booklet, which, if paid for, 
would amount to over £50'.Without even 
waiting for London's reply, a copy of the book 
was given to Bartolo who immediately began 
working on its type setting which at the time 
was undertaken by lead lettering. 
However, there were problems regarding 
the selling and purchasing of the book. It was 
deemed that the local market could not 
support the publication of the book as there 
would not be enough buyers to cover the 
expenses. In 1919, the price of this book, 
containing 10,000 words, would have been 
about one shilling. It was quite expensive for 
the time as it was about one day's wage of a 
labourer. In fact, Griffith himsclfhad serious 
doubts as to how many in Malta would be 
ready to buy this book for one shilling unless 
they were offered incentives. ls 
Unfortunately for Griffith, a measure 
taken to publish a propaganda pamphlet in 
Maltese faced resistance from the populace. 
As a result of the riots, the Government 
published a propaganda book in Maltese 
entitiedfl-MiZuri Ii ha l-Gvern; biexJghin kemm 
Jista' lill-Haddiem u lill-fqir (Measures taken 
by the Government to help the workers and 
the poor as much as possible). Amongst other 
things, the writer tried to explain that the 
introduction of taxes, such as the succession 
duty, was not aimed against the poor but 
against those who had property. However, a 
covert campaign was organised by the 
landowning classes to forestall the distribution 
of this book in the local clubs where the 
workers met. 
Union delegates were chastised for 
distributing this book to the extent that a 
union delegate was even assaulted at the 
dockyard for distributing it. It was also said 
that the dockyard workers had menaced the 
parish priest of the Cottonera as well as village 
priests for speaking and distributing this 
book to their parishioners.l6 The editor of the 
Malta Herald published half of the book in 
his newspaper, but after this he was 
intimidated and was afraid to continue with 
its publica tionY Faced with these 
difficulties, Griffith suggested to the Senior 
Naval Officer that the Director of Naval 
Intelligence, Baviere, be consulted and 
'requested to express an opinion as to the 
utility of this brochure for propaganda 
purposes in Malta' .18 
The idea of having Griffith's book 
published continued to be supported by Brian 
Barthlot, who replaced Ballard as senior naval 
officer, 'Mr. Griffiths has spent a lot of time 
and trouble in research work in compiling his 
history'.1 9 And for this reason Griffith 
deserved an honorarium for his work.2o 
Initially the Dockyard Branch was strongly 
in favour of these two pamphlets being 
published for propaganda purposes, and in 
their words 'to combat the so-called pro-
Italian movement which is the flag of all the 
local agitators and anarchists'. Furthermore, 
the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), I 
W S Henderson, believed that the question of 
the honorarium for Mr. Griffith had to be 
considered.2I 
Shortly afterwards the situation in Malta 
began to calm down, and the total cost of 
publication, distribution and the honorarium 
came to be seen as rather high. Thus, 
Henderson suggested that Malta should 
explore the possibility of having the two 
histories published in the Chronicle 
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newspaper, in chapter series. This was 
considered a golden opportunity as it would 
'increase the circulation and reach far more 
of the Maltese population'. However, 
Henderson did point out that in England the 
budget for propaganda had greatly decreased 
after the end ofthe war. Thus after peace was 
signed, it was going to be difficult to justify 
such an expense. At the same time, he 
considered this case as 'exceptional in view 
ofthe long connection between Malta and the 
Navy'. Yet the Foreign Office did not want to 
commit themselves to any form of expense 
before they had received an indication of all 
the cost involved. 
Ballard sent a handwritten letter to the 
Secretary of the Admiralty in which he 
reiterated that the purpose of the publication 
of the work was 'to help the Maltese to arrive 
at a proper understanding of the enormous 
benefits conferred upon Malta by virtue of its 
position as the Mediterranean supply and 
refitting base of the principal maritime power 
in the world'. Furthermore, Ballard sincerely 
considered that 'the ignorance of the Maltese 
masses on this point is deplorable and cannot 
be otherwise than prejudicial to Imperial 
interests'. At the same time, Ballard admitted 
that the situation was so critical that he was 
'very doubtful whether this state of affairs is 
one which can be remedied by penny 
pamphlets'. Ballard shot himself in the foot. 
This was a useless comment which was to cost 
him the whole project. 
It was at this point that Ballard wrote a 
long letter in which he expressed his 
frustration ahd at the same time tried to put 
forward his auto-candidacy for the 
governorship of Malta. 
During the period following the great 
Dockyard strike in 1917, I had ample 
evidence that while the educated classes in 
the island appreciated the great advantages 
enjoyed by Malta from its status as a British 
naval base, the illiterate masses which form 
the bulk of the population had no conception 
of them at all and I was informed from 
reliable sources that seditionists took 
advantage of this ignorance to. work up 
anti-British feeling among the labouring 
men. Field Marshal LfJrd Mithuen who 
was at that ,time the Governor, was quite 
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aware of this, and after the strike it was 
agreed between His Excellency and myself, 
with the full concurrence of the naval 
commander-in-chief that I should deliver a 
pathetic lecture in person on the subject in 
the University as something in the way of a 
possible antidote. 
I believe in such a lecture recording and at 
the request of the Maltese Government I 
agreed that it might be printed and sold by 
a local publishing agency. But I came to the 
conclusion afterwards that it had very little 
real effect for although it was attended by 
practically every resident in Malta of 
important social position, whether private 
or official, there were not the class who 
required instruction in such a matter and 
to the uneducated classes printed 
propaganda is virtually useless because the 
majority cannot even read. 
The fact is that the Maltese as a nation are 
not impressed by what they read but by what 
they hear and see. What they hear are the 
harangues of pothouse anarchists and 
certain local politicians seeking popularity 
by the easy method of abusing the 
Government. W?tat they see is that 
throughout the island it is the military and 
civil officers who exercise authority while 
the navy and naval interest are relegated 
to a minor position. 
In the light of this experience I cannot believe 
that printed pamphlets will produce any 
marked effect. A few eloquent speakers 
conversant with the language would do 
more by some visible indication of the close 
connection between British maritime power 
and the position of Malta in the Empire is 
what is really required and in my opinion 
nothing else will answer. The Admiralty has 
spent more money in Malta than all the 
other Imperial Government dePartments 
put together, but every man in the island 
knows that it is only the War Office and 
the Colonial Office that have any voice in 
the administration. 
An incident occurred while I was S.N.O. 
which I mention here as it appears to bear 
on the subject. Some little time after the 
strike had ended, one of the most prominent 
private citizens in Malta, a gentleman 
known throughout the island came 
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privately to me, and, assuring me that his 
views were widely shared, asserted with 
great emphasis that the Maltese would 
never understand their proper place in the 
Empire till they had a naval Governor. 
This last remark brings to the fore the issue 
of this whole exercise. Ballard seems to have 
understood that there was no interest in the 
publication of this book. It was at this point 
that Ballard expressed in writing another 
reason for his interest in this publication. In 
the meantime, the British had nominated 
another military man and First World War 
veteran, Field Marshal Lord Plumer, as 
Governor of Malta. Ballard seems to have had 
other ideas and considered such a choice as a 
wrong one for Malta. He quoted in support 
verbal encouragement that he claimed to have 
received from 'one of the most prominent 
private citizens of Malta'. Perhaps, he could 
have been referring to the archbishop or Lord 
Gerald Strickland, a prominent Maltese 
politician who held a seat in the House of 
Lords, and had returned to Malta after serving 
as British Governor of Tasmania (1904 to 
1909), Governor of Western Australia (I909 
to 1913) and Governor of New South Wales 
(1913 to 1917). 
As for the Colonial Office, they sought to 
limit their interest to the sole issue of 
publication without delving into other issues 
of a political nature regarding the 
governorship of Malta. As the prospects of 
financing the book receded, discussions began 
to be held to have it published at the local 
Chronicle office; this was considered as 'an 
appropriate act' after the latter press was 
destroyed during the 1919 riots for being 'pro-
British,.22 But as the expenses continued to 
appear too high, itwas suggested that it would 
be published in serial form in all the Maltese 
papers. Even this was dropped to save further 
expense and instead it was suggested that a 
comprehensive review of the pamphlet be 
published as a form of advertisement in the 
four principal papers. 
In March 1920, the Admiralty made its first 
major objection. Whilst agreeing with the 
principle of educating the Maltese, they could 
not understand why it should be paid for by 
the Admiralty when the responsibility for 
Maltese affairs fell on the Colonial Office. 
Furthermore, quoting Ballard's work, the 
Admiralty did not see the point of the 
publication when they were informed that 'the 
majority of the uneducated classes cannot 
even read'. In this situation, this book 'appears 
to be of very little value as this is the class 
which requires instruction'. The Admiralty 
therefore decided to withdraw its support. 
An Assessment of Griffith's Manuscript 
Griffith's manuscript has been extensively 
consulted and quoted in articles on the history 
of the 1Vlaltese arsenals and dockyard, but it 
should be pointed out that some of his 
material is not substantiated by official 
confidential documentation, a criticism 
which needs to be borne in mind. However, 
the piece does provide an insight into cultural 
issues through references to lost paintings and 
to important historic buildings.23 Thus, in his 
book about the British Navy, entitled The 
Crimson Handerchie/, Comte de Gobineau 
expresses the cultural interest existing 
amongst British sea captains and admits that 
the British had the habit of picking up 
paintings in Malta to decorate their ship 
cabins.23 This custom continued until recent 
times and many individuals, who used to 
work at the Malta yard or with the services, 
recount stories where military and naval 
6fficers took historical artefacts as souvenirs, 
or else ordered carpentry work of naval 
inspiration to decorate their offices or houses, 
Griffith's paper comprised two parts. The 
first covered the Knights' history and their 
arsenal at Birgu. The second dealt with the 
physical transfer of the Knights' arsenal and 
quay at Birgu into an exclusive Royal Navy 
jetty, together with the introduction into 
Malta of modern ship repair techniques and 
development of dry dock systems on the 
eastern part of the Grand Harbour next to the 
towns of Bormla and Senglea. These last two 
towns were adjacent to Birgu. The script was 
followed by two appendices reproducing 
documents and statistical data which indicate 
Griffi th's interest in historical accuracy as 
well as the importance of providing source 
material for his work. 
A critical assessment of Griffith's work 
shows that the level of accuracy varies between 
the first and the second parts. The first 
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contains a number of historical inaccuracies 
probably because he did not rely on primary 
sources. There is no doubt that for the history 
of the Knights' arsenal and navy, he used 
published sources, such as Giacomo Bosio, 
Bartolomeo Del Pozzo and Abbe de Venot's 
books. Vertot had an added advantage for 
Griffith as this was the sole Knights' history 
of which there was an English translation. The 
other two books were in Italian. Griffith had 
at his disposal a number of works in English 
published in the nineteenth century, such as 
that by Whitworth Porter.24 
Griffith pursues the following scheme in 
his first section; there is an analysis of the state 
of the fleet of the Order of St John during the 
period of the Knights' stay in Malta. This is 
split between their arrival on the island in 
1530 and the introduction of the ships-of-the-
line or vascelli in the eighteenth century. The 
Hospitaller period is concluded by an 
overview of the state of the fleet atthe time of 
the arrival of Napoleon's armada in Malta. 
He then gives an interesting detailed 
description of the property belonging to the 
Knights which was used by the navy of the 
Order. This description does not follow a 
thematic structure. Instead Griffith adopts a 
description per location. 
The first location to be analysed is that of 
Vittoriosa, including its three-arched galley 
arsenal and residences and palaces for the 
admiral and the generals of the galley fleet, 
as well as the large storehouses and slave 
prison. The second is that of Senglea. Here 
the focus is on the so-called Dockyard Terrace, 
which, during the time of the Knights, served 
as the Hotel des Capitaines des Galeres et 
Vaisseaux. He also describes the line of 
storehouses situated at the side of this quay. 
He gives a description of the French Creek 
which was situated on the opposite quay 
overlooking Corradino Hill. Griffith 
describes the building of the slip and the two 
storehouses that were used by commercial 
shipping. The building of the commercial 
ships and boats owned by the Maltese took 
place here. Finally, Griffith gives a description 
of the total income and naval expenditure of 
the Knights. He ends this section with the 
capture of Malta by Napole:on and the 
eventual incorporation of the Hospitaller's 
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ships into the French navy. 
At this juncture, one needs to point out that 
the word 'dockyard', as used by Griffith, is to 
this day, arbitrarily used in Malta for an area 
or place where ship repairing takes place. In 
reality, Malta had no dockyards until the 
arrival of the British. In medieval times, the 
island had first a ship-shed which towards the 
end of the fifteenth century began to be 
developed into an arsenaL25 During the 
Knights' period, the island lacked a proper 
dockyard. Thc Order of Saint John built its 
naval policy on the creation of distinct and 
separate arsenals. That in Birgu concentrated 
on the building of galleys. When the shi p-of-
the-line concept was introduced in the early 
eighteenth century, the Hospitallers built a 
distinct yard at French Creek. On this side of 
the harbour, in the French Creek, the arsenal 
of the tartane boats was situated. They also 
created autonomous stores for each category 
of ship without any real synergy between 
them. 
The British changed the whole concept. 
They wanted one unified area and throughout 
their one hundred and fifty year stay 
endeavoured to follow the British model. The 
Grand Harbour terrain, with its many inlets, 
made the development of such a concept a 
difficult one. Yet, slowly they succeeded in 
developing this strategy by first abolishing the 
galley arsenal and then concentrating their 
resources on developing a complex of yards 
on the Bormla side, joined together by tunnels 
and internal roads. Thus a dock complex was 
created.26 
This complex began to take shape in the 
middle of the nineteenth century with the 
development of the first dry dock in Malta in 
the area ofBormla known as the Mandaraggio 
in 1843. Griffith then recounts the history of 
the construction of the other docks, in 
particular of the Somerset Dock (1867), 
Hydraulic Dock (1873), Hamilton Dock 
(1883), including costs of expansion of the 
Bormla dock and some of the ships that were 
docked in these dry docks. He also refers to 
the sole warship to be buil t in Malta, the HMS. 
Melita (1889). He also makes reference to 
extensive works undertaken in 1901 to 
increase naval accommoda tion at the harbour 
which included the building of the breakwater 
(£700,000), the New Docks (£800,000), the 
New Factory (£30,000), the Saw Mills 
(£17,000), the Ordnance Depot (£102,000), the 
Coaling Depot (£120,000) and the building 
of a new road and tunnel within the yard 
(£49,000). 
Griffith gives brief but detailed 
information of the period of transition from 
the Birgu site of the galley arsenal to the new 
hydraulically operated dry dock at Bormla. 
The shift meant the implementation of a 
number of policies and the take over of a 
number of properties by the Admiralty. 
Griffith details the history behind the 
development of these properties. It is doubtful 
whether he was much interested in the 
economic dynamics, but more moved by the 
fact that many of these properties were 
important palaces, believing that it was 
important to chart how they came into the 
hands of the Admiral ty. He presents a listing 
of the property owned by the Royal Navy in 
Valletta, Senglea, Birgu and Bormla. 
Griffith then proceeds to give the names 
of ships which used Malta as their base during 
different periods of time. Special attention 
was given to the sea battle of Navarrino, 
including the detail of expenses for the work 
done on the repair of ships, the amount of food 
consumed by the Russian fleet and the cost of 
victualling the sick and wounded Russian 
sailors and soldiers. 
The worldng staff and their payrolls are 
discussed by Griffith both in the text and more 
importantly in the appendixes, together with 
the size of the workforce present in the different 
sections of the yard. In itself, this was a very 
important consideration for which Griffith 
needs to be given due credit. One should keep 
in mind that up to a hundred and fifty years 
earlier, the minor staff employed in the navy 
was not considered of great importance. The 
sailors and naval employees were just a 
number in a larger system. A general very 
degrading view of the marine staffwas shared 
by the sea captains. In his evocative book, 
Arthur Herman argues that 'in the minds of 
most sea captains, the mariners were basically 
landsmen who helped in raising the anchor 
and handling the guns in a sea fight; otherwise 
they were an afterthought,.27 This view is 
supported by the fact that for a long period of 
time mariners lacked any uniform, and were 
literally dressed in ragged patched 
clothing;28 there are studies which show that 
few sailors were over forty, and almost none 
lived past fifty during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century.29 Organisation came 
about towards the end of the eighteenth 
century. A system was created by which the 
British Navy became one of the most over-
organised and needless to say rigid maritime 
institutions at the time. Such reflections by 
Griffith seem to me a direct response to this 
situation which made Admiralty 
establishments able to respond quickly to 
crisis, even if they remained, as any other 
institution run by human beings, subject to 
breakdown at unexpected moments. 
The employment situation is also 
discussed with regard to salaries, a thorny 
question at the beginning of the twentieth 
century and a cause of two strikes during 
Ballard's time. Besides the salary scales and 
different type of work categories, Griffith 
discusses problems faced by the British 
regarding work with the Admiralty. The many 
religious feasts that used to take place inMalta 
were having, according to Griffith, a negative 
effect on the work at the Admiralty naval 
establishments, as many workers absented 
themselves from work to celebrate their 
religious saints. Even in terms of skills, Malta 
had a deficit, having to import skills from 
abroad. 
Griffith concludes his work with thirteen 
appendixes touching on different aspects of 
the yard, half of which concern the amounts 
paid as wages to different categories of the 
drydock's personnel. 
Griffith's work shows the heady experience 
that setting up a modern dockyard must have 
been. But he does not touch on the political 
issues or the need for poli tical stabili ty which 
guaranteed long-term planning of naval 
development. Nor does he delve into the 
management of the dockyards which must 
have been based during this period on a 
sound footing. The local dockyards did not 
have to face any challenges from the 
commercial sector. The competitive edge 
came from political and war crisis. The shock 
to this system only came in time of peace or 
when international ententes and treaties 
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knocked the Malta Admiralty yard from its 
global perch. Whatever the case, the 
commission of this research came at a time 
when the faith of Malta as a British naval base 
was atthe crossroads. It is no coincidence that 
Ballard knew that the Admiralty's view of the 
future of Malta was one of gloom. 
Conclusion 
In retrospect, it is something of a surprise 
that Griffith's effort was never published as a 
piece of acad"mic work since it is arguably of 
value to historians, which was Ballard's view. 
Moreover, the cost to the Admiralty was 
minute when set against its overall budget. 
At the same time, tracking the process which 
might have led to publication does offer some 
insight into the workings of naval 
bureaucracy and individuals' motivations. 
The Griffith episode also illustrates the way 
in which a colonial power endeavoured to 
manage the local populace. 
Epilogue: Malta and the Navy 
At the turn of the century, the golden age 
of the Malta dockyards was already over. 'On 
the British Navy rests the British Empire', 
said Fisher when hewas Commander-in-Chief 
of the Mediterranean. Yet Malta failed to 
feature in his plans. In Fisher's mind there 
were 'five strategic keys' on which the British 
Empire and the world economic system rested 
- Gibraltar and Suez, Singapore, the Cape of 
Good Hope and the Straits ofDover.30 Malta 
did not feature in his thoughts despite the fact 
that it was the centre of the Mediterranean 
Fleet anh he was resident on the island. In 
fact, the focus was now more on the Atlantic 
and the Pacific Ocean. The Mediterranean 
fleet shrank from fourteen battleships in 1902 
to eight in 1904, and six in 1907.31 
In fact, Fisher did not see any real future 
for Malta. According to Fisher, the two points 
of British interest in the Mediterranean were 
Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. Malta lay in 
the middle butFisher's concept of relying on 
fast ships made Malta's advantageous 
position practically irrelevant. Unlike 
Gibraltar, Malta had a large population 
which was continuously on the increase. Its 
big population made it a'n unsustainable 
island foran Empire whose only reason for 
possession was its strategic value. At the same 
time, itwas a value that was losing its political 
and military importance. 
Immedia tely after the First World War was 
over, the British did their utmost to try to 
solve the Malta problem by relinquishing as 
much as possible of their responsibility for 
internal affairs, giving the chance to the 
Maltese themselves to govern and therefore 
develop their island economically and 
socially. It was only due to the advent of 
fascism in Italy and the evenWal alliance of 
Mussolini with Nazi Germany that a new 
expedient was created for Britain to reaffirm 
its hold on Malta. They sought to keep Malta 
so that it would not go to the enemy. The 
Second World War proved Ballard's 
prediction right, Malta became a valuable 
asset. But once the war was over, the post-First 
World War story repeated itself wi th the 
difference that now Malta ended up in the fast 
track for independence. 
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SOME NOTES ON CONFERENCE DISCUSSIONS 
Ann Coats 
Venice 
The conference papers drew a range of 
questions, including 'What happened to two 
Venetian gondolas and four gondoliers 
presented to Charles II and visible in a picture 
of Charles II's wedding in 1662?' None ofthe 
assembled company was able to answer, so it 
remains a rna ner to be researched. 
Lady Frances Clarke from Venice in Peril 
reported that the Armstrong crane no. 2919, 
built in Newcastle on Tyne of rolled steel, did 
not have an assured future in the Arsenale. It 
will cost around 900,000 euros to preserve. It 
is rusting and a plan is required to make it 
secure. She sent a full report for the August 
issue of Dockyards. 
B Vale asked Dr Rose to confirm that 
England was not really a seafaring nation 
until the reign of Elizabeth. She reiterated this 
point: being surrounded by sea does not make 
a maritime nation, there are often arbitrary 
reasons leading to a nation becoming 
'maritime'. In the Middle Ages England was 
preoccupied with fighting the Scots and 
French. The earliest European seafarers were 
the Genoese, earliest map makers from 
Majorca, working for Aragon. 
Dr Rose was also asked if religious conflict 
was a reason for English maritime 
exploration. Susan replied that John Dee was 
atypical. The Black Legend (depicting the 
Spanish Inquisition, the Duke of Alba's 
actions in the United Provinces and Spanish 
treatment of aboriginals in the West Indies 
as brutal) incited anti-Spanish feeling, but 
religion was not the main motive. Exploration 
was really about trade, shifting at the end of 
the Elizabethan period from the 
Mediterranean to the Atlantic. Most leading 
explorers were Spanish, although Cabot was 
Venetian and Columbus Genoan. 
P Dawson asked about the reliability of the 
claims made in G Menzies, 1421, for the 
extent of Chinese exploration. Dr Rose said 
that many have not been substantiated. 
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A question was asked about Henry Marten 
and the Rump Parliament: how strong was 
republicanism in Genoa and Venice? Dr 
Caniato replied that the purity of Rome and 
Venice was a myth. Venice could not be 
compared with Rome. Venice considered 
herself a successor to part of the Roman 
Empire, but looked more towards Byzantium, 
the eastern Roman Empire. M Ferrari Bravo 
added that offices had to be sold in the 
seventeenth century to raise money to cover 
the costs of war. 
Professor R Knight asked 'When was 
Venice at her peak?' Dr Caniato replied: 'From 
the fall of Constantinople (1453) to the second 
half of the sixteenth century. Military losses 
inspired the expansion of the Arsenale. In the 
nineteenth century it was revived: wood 
changed to iron; oar power to steam. Again 
in the 1970s and 1980s there was another 
revival. 
It was asked 'Why were Mediterranean 
slips and docks covered and those in northern 
Europe not?' Professor Knight answered that 
in some countries in N Europe covered ships 
from the 1750s, to protect from damp and 
cold, but the issues in British dockyards were 
cost and the disruption of erecting such a large 
roof span. Mediterranean galley sheds were 
narrower, therefore easier to cover. Charles 
Middleton, Navy Board Controller 1778-
1790, proposed covered slips to Lord Howe, 
First Lord of the Admiralty January-April 
1783, in the 17708 but they were not speaking 
to each other in the 1780s. This issue was not 
satisfactorily solved, therefore, until iron 
spans adapted from railway sheds were 
introduced to dockyards in the 1840s and 
1850s. 1 B Vale commented that the Asia 
Minor galley sheds in P MacDougall's 
pictures were grand buildings because they 
had been built by the ruler. 
A question was asked on how Venice was 
responding to the threat of global warming 
and rising sea levels. M Ferrari Bravo 
described the current Mose Project launched 
by Berlusconi in May 2003. MOSE: Modulo 
Sperimentale Elettromeccanico, an 
experimental electro-mechanical module, is 
a prototype testing 79 inflatable gates to stem 
the flow of water through the three inlets into 
Venice's lagoon. The whole project was 
presented by the Consorzio Venezia Nuova in 
2002 after many years of technical and 
political debate. The gates will be raised 
whenever the sea level rises significantly, three 
or four times a year. Initially about twelve 
closures a year were foreseen, but an upgraded 
project has reduced the range of intervention. 
M Tucker asked if the Arsenale galley sheds 
were big enough to construct the larger 
eighteenth century ships. Dr Caniato 
answered that those were built outside the 
Arsenale. 
Malta 
In October 2007 the Society enjoyed its first 
overseas conference, fourteen members 
participa ting in the International Congress of 
Maritime Museums Conference in Malta 
Conference Centre, Valletta. Our thanks are 
due to the fraternal support of Stephen Riley, 
Mary-Louise Williams and Tony Tibbles of 
ICMM and Pierre Cassar of Heritage Malta. 
Jonathan Coad was one of the keynote 
. conference speakers. He surveyed the facilities 
of overseas bases, showing that in the 
nineteenth century Malta was the best 
provided British overseas base because the 
Royal Navy had taken over the Knights 
Hospitallers facilities and benefited from the 
locally trained labour force. ICMM delegates 
then joined the NDS session whose theme was 
'Malta - Dockyard, Strategic Pivot, and 
Maritime Heritage Outlook', chaired by 
Professor Roger Knight, Greenwich Maritime 
Institute. 
David Davies's paper traced connections 
between Malta and the Royal Navy since 1540 
when Henry VIn ejected the Knights 
Hospitallers from England, although many 
English knights were members of the Order 
of St John. Commenting on the 'intangible' 
heritage of the role played by the dockyard 
in society and politics, during the 1930s, 
Henry Frendo's paper was an eye-opener for 
most delegates, as he detailed the extent of 
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British hegemony and the importance of the 
dockyard within Maltese social and political 
life. 
Simon Mercierca's paper analysed and 
reproduced W A. Griffith's 1917 report which 
gave an overview of 19th century naval history 
in Malta, with special reference to the 
dockyard. It offered comprehensive 
development and transition of the Knights 
Hospitallers' Arsenal during the nineteenth 
century. 
Questions followed. Asked about the 
provision of water for the navy and dockyard, 
S Mercierca stated that streams drained into 
the creeks, an aqueduct built in 1640 brought 
water from Rabat to Valletta, and all houses 
in Valletta were built with wells. R Knight 
reported that Nelson's 1st rates needed 3 tons 
of water a day, therefore his fleet needed 30-
40 tons a day. 
In response to a query about conservation 
of the docks, S Mercierca showed a proposed 
development scheme for the storehouses next 
to No.1 Dock, which has lost its gates. It 
threatened the integrity of the original 
buildings although the original fa~ade will 
be conserved. Much nineteenth and twentieth 
century dockyard heritage has not been well 
conserved, compared with that dating from 
the period of the Knights, because of the 
current low regard for its history as part of an 
imperial past and its association with 
pollution. H Frendo stated that there had 
been a degradation of aesthetics and ethics 
which was threatening the heritage of the 
dockyards because there was no current 
context f01'.this history. Whereas everyone 
once obtained their living from the sea, few 
people now use the water and Cospicua 
children were scared of the sea. The 
contribution of dockyards is now not obvious 
to younger generations because their heritage 
is hidden behind walls. Roger Knight noted 
that Jonathan Coad had spent 40 years 
researching and working to protect the British 
dockyard built efl}.'ironment, saving what we 
now see at Chatham Dockyard. We need that 
commitment and knowledge to preserve what 
is still remaining of dockyards worldwide. Sue 
Lumas suggested that oral history can also 
recover the diversity of stories. 
To a question about the firing of the noon 
day gun, S Mercierca answered that the 
tradition was began by the Knights to echo 
the ringing of church bells. It was continued 
by the British. Together these papers gave a 
chronological range from the seventeenth to 
the twentieth centuries and a thematic breadth 
of Malta dockyard seen from both British and 
Maltese perspectives, its tangible and 
intangible heritage. They added considerably 
to delegates' understanding of Valetta 
Harbour creeks, viewed memorably on 
Wednesday 10 October from a dghajsa (a 
small local boat). 
Summing up, Roger Knight welcomed 
these new insights in to Maltese history and 
into the history of the home yards. In Britain 
there were two classes in Dockyard Schools, 
also driven by merit. Walls were also 
important for British doclqards as a security 
measure, which paradoxically generated a 
sense of insecurity. We need to foster each 
others' stories. 
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